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Maize Industry in East Africa 
This paper developed from my attempts to investigate the prospects 
for co-ordinated production and marketing policies for major food crops 
within East Africa., The maize industry provides a useful case-study in 
this context since, of all foodstuffs, maize has been the one most 
subject to regulation and the one most affected by consistent regional 
self-sufficiency policies» The intention of this paper is to point out 
some of the problems which have arisen as a result of this regulated 
marketing; a subsequent paper will attempt to suggest a viable alternative 
to the present system, • 
Historical background 
Government control of the maize industry began in 1943. The 
first attempt to increase food production in the 1942 maize-planting 
season in Kenya coincided with a severe drought which had its two 
inevitable consequences, a maize shortage and a Commission of Inquiry. 
The Recommendations of the 1943 Food Shortage Commission of Inquiry 
not only determined the pattern of war-time control but remained the 
basis of Kenyan policy almost until the present-day. As Kenya is the 
chief maize-consuming country in East Africa, her policy has been the 
key factor in the development of maize-growing in East Africa,. 
available,,. 
ii) To induce them to increase production a price would have to 
be fixed which guaranteed them high and stable profits. 
iii) The guaranteed minimum price should be announced before 
planting each season. 
These recommendations were adopted and the industry was organised 
under the East African Cereals Pool. Kenya was the chief member and 
evolved the most "organised" system under its own Maize and Produce 
Control but attempts were made to plan food production on an East 
African basis. One important consequence of this production drive was 
that Uganda became a producer of maize on a reasonably large scale and 
as a cash crop for the first time. 
The 1943 Commission advised that:-
i) The large-scale, European farmers were the only ones 
capable of producing the maize needed in the short time 
*Note; Economic Development Research Papers are written as a basis 
for discussion in the Makerere Economic Research Seminar. 
They are not publications and are subject to revision. 
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The Cereals Pool ended in 1952 and, in the following year Uganda 
reverted to an uncontrolled marketing system. Tanganyika's Grain Storage 
Department struggled on for a while longer but was so bedevilled by 
losses caused by exporting surplus production on a glutted world market 
that its control was gradually dismantled between 1955 and 1957„ In 
1963 Tanganyika re-established control over maize under the National 
Agricultural Products Marketing Board* Throughout this period Kenya 
had soldiered on with a regulated system under statutory bodies whose 
regular changes of name (Maize Control, Maize Marketing Board, and now 
Maize and Produce Control) were punctuated by further Commissions of 
Inquiry. 
Problems arising from this situation 
As previously mentioned, Kenya's policy has been the crucial 
factor throughout this period. Although the other two countries have., 
periodically imposed import or export restrictions, it has been Kenya 
which has most consistently denied Uganda and Tanganyika access to its 
internal market and has attempted to develop complete self-sufficency. 
The failure of this policy can be seen in the regular imports of maize 
from outside East Africa (usually fiom the U.S.A.) in years of shortage.. 
Kenya has placed herself in the impossible position of trying 
to balance supply and demand in a market the underlying conditions 
of which are:-
i) A supply subject to wide fluctuations depending upon 
weather conditions. 
ii) A highly price-inelastic demand on the internal market, 
iii) A highly price-elastic demand on the world market. 
As the export price on the world market has, since the end of 
the Korean War, been below the price paid to Kenyan growers while,at 
the same time, the price of maize imported from the world market 
(including transport charges) has been higher than the Kenyan price, 
a serious problem ensues whenever supply and demand are not exactly 
equal. In years of shortage maize has to be imported, the Board 
normally covering the cost of this by imposing a cess on Kenyan 
growers. In years of excess supply the Board has to dispose of the 
surplus by exports at the low world price, the loss being recouped by 
a deduction from the payments made to growers, a reduction in the 
average price. Farming being the risky business that it is, every year 
Kenya has either a deficit or a shortage as the production cycle fluctuates 
around the level of 15 million bags which is the generally accepted estimate 
of total consumption. 
o o o o o o o O 
The operation of this system, and the effects of the Board's 
attempts to control it can be seen from the following example of one wave 
of the cy'Cle which followed the rain failure in the 1960/61 season and the 
consequent shortage during 1961c 
1961 
Maize shortage necessitated imports for famine relief. Appeals 
were made for farmers to plant more maize in the 1961/62 season and the 
"guaranteed" price was raised slightly to Shs.35,,50 per bag (200 lb.). 
A Maize Marketing Board Working Party was appointed to investigate ways 
of making the marketing system more flexible. 
1962 
A bumper crop was produced and the Maize Board was left with a 
650,000 surplus, the export price for which was only Shs.15/- per bag. 
To cover this loss a cess was imposed on the "guaranteed" price, leaving 
f arme rs with an average price of only Shs.25/- per bag. The farmers were 
angered by the failure to pay the promised price. Mr. V.G. Matthews was 
appointed to inquire into future pricing and marketing arrangements needed 
to take into account the impact of Independence and Settlement Schemes 
coupled with increasing use of high-yielding hybrid maizes. 
1963 
Excellent climatic conditions produced a huge crop. The Board 
exported the record amount of 1,100,000 bags (meanwhile, from August 
until October, Uganda was experiencing a shortage and the Kampala price 
rose to Shs.40/- per bag *1)= In May Matthews had reported and had 
recommended a "cheap posho policy" with a progressive reduction of price 
over the next three or four years until it was fixed at around Shs.20-24/- (*2). 
Again growers received between Shs.24/- and Shs.28/- per bag. The price 
for 1963/64 was declared as Shs.35.50 again but farmers had by now lost 
all faith in it. 
1964 
The crop sold to the Board was much smaller as a result of reduced 
planting but the average price paid was still only Shs.29/- as the export 
loss from 1963 was still being recovered. Farmers began to warn that hybrid 
maize was not having the rapid results which Matthews had expected. The 
Board was satisfied that there was no fear of a surplus in 1964/65 and, 
in order to ensure adequate supplies, raised the guaranteed price to Shs.32.50= 
(*1) Uganda Argus, various dates between August 19th and November 5th 1963. 
(*2) Report on the Kenyan Maize Industry, 1963, V.G. Matthews. 
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1965 
The large-scale farmers had no faith in the guaranteed price and 
reduced their acreage still further. This coincided with a disastrous 
drought? serious famine was only partially averted by the import of 
250,000 bags from Uganda and Tanzania and 500,000 bags from the U.S.A. 
This shortage, plus the Board's delay in importing maize was investigated 
by the Maize Commission of Inquiry (*1). 
1966 
The gazetted price was raised to Shs.37.00 and appeals were made 
for greater production. A good growing season resulted in a large 
surplus, exports and a reduction in the actual price to Shs.33.00. 
The recommendations of the 1965 Maize Commission of Inquiry 
were broadly accepted by the Kenyan Govenment and most of them have been 
put into practice. This entails no drastic change in the system; the 
Commission accepted the basic premise of the need for self-sufficiency 
in maize production and advised the continuation of control via a 
Marketing Board using pricing and distribution arrangements little 
different from the pre-existing ones. The Commission's answer to the 
problem of alternating surpluses and deficits was an expansion of 
storage capacity so that a reserve of 500,000 bags could be held from 
year to year; a surplus in one year would be stored until it could be 
sold during the next shortage. 
The Government has fully accepted this idea and, in fact, more 
than merely accepted it since by the start of 1968 the Maize and 
Produce Board had sufficient capacity to store a strategic reserve of 
1,200,000 bags (*2). This is very nearly equal to an average year's 
throughput by the Board (normally around 1% million bags) and it remains 
to be seen whether this will be adequate to stabilize maize supplies. 
Fundamental faults of the Kenyan system 
Although it is possible to point out many faults in the organization 
of the Board, the pricing system, transport and many other facets of 
the control structure (which are well covered in various Government reports 
and a great volume of other literature), it seems to me that thS system 
has failed in the past as a result of two major faults. To the extent 
that these are not remedied in the future it will undoubtedly continue 
to fail. 
(*l) Report presented May 25th 1966. 
(*2) Board Chairman quoted in East African Standard, January 13th 1968. 
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These faults ares-
i) The inadequacy of the Board's scale of operations 
It is usually estimated that Kenyans consume about 15 million 
tags of maize each year, Most of this is supplied from 
small-scale subsistence farms direct to the consumers, supplemented 
by village-level trade which does not pass through the hands 
of the Maize Board (and is thus an illegal black-market). In 
an 
addition to this/unknown quantity of maize is smuggled from 
Kenya into the two neighbouring countries, the chief recipient 
being Uganda. Most of this maize probably comes from small 
African producers but some of it is undoubtedly obtained by 
theft from large-scale farms in the Western Region. 
The Maize Board handles on an average only 1% million 
bags, or roughly 107o of total production. With information 
on the rest of the crop virtually non-existent, this is a 
ridiculously small base from which to try to predict production 
levels or with which to attempt to stabilize supply. This 
is especially true because the amount handled by the Board 
does not bear a constant relation to total production but 
instead behaves to some extent as a residual after the needs 
of local consumption and smuggling have been satisfied. 
While the maize handled by the Board came almost solely from 
European farmers the fluctuations in the amount handled were 
not so severe since these farmers sold all their crop to the 
Board. Since Independence, however, the European-owned 
acreage has declined and African farmers, both large-scale 
and those on Settlement Schemes, have become important 
suppliers to the Board, either on a regular basis or simply 
in years when they grow too much to dispose of in any other 
way. By 1966 it was estimated that 50% of the Board's 
annual supplies came from African growers (*1). 
For many years Government, the Boards and the European 
farmers appeared to be entirely ignorant of the fact that 
maize was grown anywhere else than on large farms. They 
were solely concerned with that maize which went through 
the official channels. 
(*1) Maize Commission of Inquiry Report. 
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Many instances of the effects of this attitude could be given;the 
attempt of Mr. J.H. Feingold,President of the Kenya National Farmers 
Union,to explain the situation ..in the maize industry provides a good 
example.In arguing that the answer to the problem was to develop new 
uses for the maize so as to consume the surpluses,he stated that 
"Each year 1,500,000 bags of maize are used for human 
consumption.If that figure was to be raised to 3,000,000 
bags for human consumption and industrial use,a 
fluctuation of 500,000 bags would not affect prices".(*I) 
The 1965 Maize Commission of Inquiry was the first official body 
to recognize the hopelessness of any attempt to deal with the 
overall maize position by handling only 10% of total 
production and having no knowledge of the other 90%.The Inquiry 
recommended the collection of more data on the unseen portion of 
the crop. 
The various Kenyan Boards have then either ignored or 
declared illegal the methods by which the vast majority of Kenyans 
obtain their maize supplies.The Boards have been supplying,to an 
extent which depended on the degree of shortage in any year,only the 
urban denand;their role as suppliers to the rural community arose 
when it became necessary to distribute imported famine relief.In 
normal times most consumers grow their own maize or buy it from 
neighbours,risking prosecution for illegal trading.During every 
shortage the Board convinces itself that its price control is 
working while any farmer can obtain a price higher than the Board's 
offer in his local village and even that maize which is handled by 
the Board often ends up on the black market.Even without a shortage 
most growers can find a price higher than the Board's as a result 
of the margin between the Board's buying and selling prices.Bor 
example, at a time when the Board was buting for So 29.50 per bag the 
price of maize from the Board was 3s 39.15 (*2);most farmers could 
(*I) reported in E.A. Standard,October 21st. 1966. 
(2) letter to S.A. Standard from Board General Manager,4/1/64. 
7 
probably manage to find someone willing to pay them ?s 35 for a bag, 
especially since the buyer might thus save himself a journey to the 
Board's store. 
In such a situation any attempt at price control is bound 
to fail.The rigid prices-,transport margins,buying points etc. 
provided by the Board are simply circumvented by farmers and traders 
who are able to perform the marketing function wi.th a smaller margin 
of profit. 
Thus Marketing Boards in Kenya have failed both in 
regulating -tha supply of maize and in controlling the producers' and 
consumers' prices.Unless.they were able to handle a considerably 
laregr proportion of the total supply it is difficult to see how 
they could have been m'o-re successful.Since the policing costs of 
ensuring that all maize went through the Board would be prohibitive, 
it would seem wisest to try to find some other method of regulating 
price and supply. 
Given the inelastic demand and the highly erratic nature 
of supply,it -seems unlikely that a completely free system would 
succeed in moderating the size of the fluctuations of these two 
variables any better than the Boards have done,though it might 
reduce the size of the marketing margin.A solution to this particular 
problem may lie in the cremation of a body which acts merely as a 
residual buyer in the market,standing ready to buy,from anyone, at 
a certain guaranteed minimum price and selling' off its stocks to 
prevent the price rising above a certain ceiling.This idea has been 
promoted for many years ..by'Mr. K.P.Shah in Kenya(1).The success of 
such a scheme would depend on the prices chosen as the floor and 
ceiling and upon the size of the stocks which could be carried.In 
this respect it would be no more likely to succeed than the present 
Maize and Produce Board but the big advantage would be that the 
operators of the buffer-stock would have to concern themselves with 
the whole of Kenya's production and take steps to collect more 
information on it.Governments have,however,always been chary of this 
solution as they fear that it would allow the "middlemen11 to exploit 
both consumers and producers (--2) . 
(*I)e.g. Evidence to Maize Marketing Board Working Party,1962. 
(*2) discussed in 1965 Commission of Inquiry Report. 
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ii) The insistence on Kenyan self-sufficiency 
This aspect of Kenyan policy is closely connected with the control 
of only a small portion of total production and with the reliance. 
upon large-scale farmers for production of maize for sale.The 
acceptance of the fact that African growers could not supply the 
cash market led to the creation of'a particular tjrpe of marketing 
system and this system operated in such a way as to allow its 
operators and the Government to ignore the very considerable cash 
trade in maize in which African growers were in fact engaging. • 
•This refusal to believe that African growers were 
capable of producing reliable supplies not only led to a concentration 
on the large "European growers but also logically led to a determination 
not to rely for supplies on the African growers in Uganda and 
Tanganyika.There is an interesting exposition of this philosophy in a 
Kenya Government Paper of 1957 which merits fairly full•quatation 
"In order to feed the Go'ony's African labour force ........ 
especially in the two a^.jor towns of Nairobi.... and Mombasa 
....,it would be most imprudent to rely solely on deliveries 
by peasant farmers whether in Kenya or in neighbouring 
territories. it still remains true that the majority 
of the 600.000 African farmers in Kenya plant maize primarily 
for family subsistence and only secondarily for cash.The 
result is that,out of a total crop grown in the non-
scheduled areas which is estimated to vary between about 13 
and 14 million bags each year,the bulk is retained for family 
consumption. .... .Thus the surplus available for delivery 
to markets is only a s^all fraction of the whole and is 
liable to fluctuate widely from season to season according 
to weather conditions. .... over the last five years high 
and low deliveries from the non-scheduled areas (have been) 
691,000 and 1,483,000 bags,a fluctuation of over 100%. 
Deliveries are even less dependable in Uganda and 
Tanganyika .......Since these deliveries cannot be relied 
on,the only other sources of maize are from overseas or from 
farmers in the scheduled areas." (*I) 
Even if it were correct to assume that Africans could never become 
suppliers to the cash market,the reason for labelling them unreliable 
(*I) Kenya Sessional Paper no. 6 1957/58 
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is somewhat surprising as,over the same five-year period (1952 to 
1957) non-African production reached a high of 141,700 tons (1,587,000 
bags) and a low of 82,900 tons (928,480 bags),a 70% fluctuation (*I) 
indicating that the 'European farmers were not remarkably more 
reliable. 
It seems that,since Independence,this attitude towards the 
African producer is beginning to break down.Certainly the 1965 
Commission of Inquiry found no reason to recommend reliance upon 
either the large or small farm sectors for maize supplies.The Report 
pointed out that deliveries to the Board, fiom each source move 
together remarkably closely and each provides about 50% of the total 
supply. 
If it is now accepted that African growers are a satisfactory 
source of maize,there is little reason for refusing to import supplies 
of maize from Uganda and Tanganyika.A move towards reliance on a 
supply-area covering the whole of East Africa would not only help to 
stabilize the total supply,by balancing shortages in one area against 
goood harvest elsewhere but would bring about a more efficient 
allocation of resources by concentrating production in the most 
suitable regions.An example was given earlier in this paper of an 
occasion in 1963 when a shortage in Kampala coincided with a huge 
exportable surplus in Kenya,freer trade between the two countries 
could have helped to solve both their problems.Similarly many writers 
have opined that the Kenyan price has been kept far too high by 
reliance on high-cost large-scale farmers(*2).While data on production 
costs are too scanty to make this easily verifiable the fact that 
wholesale prices (not grower prices) on the Kampala Produce Exchange 
(-3) vary between 19/- and 40/- per bag indicates that peasant production 
costs can be lower than the prevailing farm prices in Kenya.The 
continued growing of maize in extremely marginal areas of Kenya such 
as the Eastern Province is also an indication that prices are high 
enough to support relatively high-cost producers. 
The extensive smuggling trade between Kenya and her 
(*I) Source E.A. Quarterly Economic & Staistical Bulletin 
(*2) see,for instance,M.P. Miracle,E.A. Ec.Rev. Dec. 1959 
(-*3) irregular reports in Uganda Argus 
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neighbours provides a more pragmatic argument for freer trade in 
maize.If figures were available on this trade it might well be a 
surprise to find the extent to which the complementarities in food 
production of the three countries,at least between border areas were 
already being exploited. 
Conclusion 
The failure Pf Kenya to evolve a stable system of maize supply at 
low prices has,in my opinion,as its fundamental cause the failure to 
utilize the African farmer as a cash producer.Instead of encouraging 
these farmers to produce for the market,the marketing system has, 
until recently,ignored them;indeed laws have been passed to prevent 
them from selling their maize in ways most convenient and profitable 
to them. "In the-few years since Ind upend oncoAfrican participation in 
even the official marketing channels has expanded to such an extent 
that it seems reasonable to assume that,had the efforts of the 
extension service and marketing officials been directed towards 
encouraging African production of maize for cash over the past 
twenty years,Kenya could long ago have ceased to rely on European 
farmers for supplies of her basic staple food. 
Moreover this approach to maize production has helped to 
prevent the growth of a common market in East African maize 
production.This may well have resulted in Kenyans paying more than 
was necessary for their maize,with obvious effects on the cost of 
living,the level of wages and hence the general level of costs,but 
has probably also retarded the economic growth of East Africa as a 
v/hole by preventing certain areas of Uganda and Tanganyika from 
developing cash farming based on the demand of the Kenyan market. 
Given this decision to try for self-sufficieny,the fact that 
the Marketing Boards have handled a very small proportion of total 
production and have remained in ignorance about what was happening 
to the rest prevented the aim being acheived. 
Thus Kenya has probably inflated the cost of her maize 
beyond what was necessary and has still not managed to reliably 
feed her population,still less to do so at a fairly stable price.It 
may well be that the current policy of massive reserve storage will 
enable her to succeed in doing this but the question of inflated 
costs and inefficient resource allocation will remain. 
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